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Abstract
Despite the abundance of evidence that human perception is penetrated by beliefs and expectations, scientific research so
far has entirely neglected the possible impact of religious background on attention. Here we show that Dutch Calvinists and
atheists, brought up in the same country and culture and controlled for race, intelligence, sex, and age, differ with respect to
the way they attend to and process the global and local features of complex visual stimuli: Calvinists attend less to global
aspects of perceived events, which fits with the idea that people’s attentional processing style reflects possible biases
rewarded by their religious belief system.
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Introduction
Perceiving our world is an active process. We do not passively
register the objects and events we encounter but explore and
investigate them, attend to features and characteristics we find
interesting and ignore those that we do not. As emphasized by the
New Look perspective to human perception [1], this suggests that
our perception and attention reflect our moods, needs, expecta-
tions, and beliefs. Recent research has extended the list of possible
factors to culture. Increasing evidence suggests, for instance, that
people growing up in the North American culture are less sensitive
to contextual cues and show a more analytic cognitive style (i.e.,
they pay more attention to local features of objects and events)
than people growing up in an Asian culture, who exhibit a more
holistic style [2,3]. Holistic and analytic processing styles can be
induced even within the same population by having people work
through tasks that draw attention to either personal interdepen-
dence (e.g., by instructing participants to circle all relational
pronouns, such as ‘‘we’’, ‘‘our’’, or ‘‘us’’, in a text) or independence
(by having them to circle pronouns referring to the self
independent of others, such as ‘‘I’’, ‘‘my’’, or ‘‘me’’) [4]. Recent
electrophysiological evidence suggests that culturally or experi-
mentally induced attention to the global context versus local detail
affects the processing of visual features rather early in the
processing stream. In particular, marking independent pronouns
yields an enlarged P1 amplitude to local than global targets in a
global-local task ([5]; see below) at lateral occipital electrodes (i.e.,
in the visual cortex), while marking interdependent pronouns has
the opposite effect [6].
However, research so far has completely ignored the influence
of religion on attentional processing. Given that culture is
commonly defined as a system of shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviors, and artifacts, this blind spot is surprising. It is even
more surprising if one considers the recent history of increasingly
dramatic international and societal conflicts based on apparent
incompatibilities between the religious beliefs of social groups and
nations and the behavioral implications thereof. If the perception
of events would be modulated not only by upbringing and culture
but also, or perhaps even mainly, by religious factors, it would
seem particularly important to study how they affect perception.
Here, we provide evidence that religious belief may systematically
bias visual attention.
We investigated whether Calvinists and atheists, brought up in
the same country and culture (the Netherlands), differ with respect
to the way they attend to and process global and local features of
visual stimuli. Cultural (and, possibly, other) differences in
perceptual processing and attentional emphasis are assumed to
be produced by social practice [7,8] that provides selective reward
for attending to particular stimulus features and adopting
particular attentional control settings [5,6]. We speculate that
practicing a religion and being exposed to particular religious
practices may lead, among other things, to a chronic bias towards
particular attentional control parameters. In particular, our study
was inspired by the Dutch neo-Calvinism concept of sphere
sovereignty, which emphasizes that each sphere or sector of society
has its own responsibilities and authorities, and stands equal to
other spheres [9,10]. If Dutch Calvinists, as compared to Dutch
atheists, have been rewarded more for adopting a processing style
that emphasizes a rather independent view of the self, this would
be likely to induce an attentional set that facilitates the processing
of the local details [6]. If so, this should affect performance on the
global-local task developed by Navon [5], which indexes how fast
people can process global and local characteristics of hierarchically
constructed visual stimuli (e.g., larger letters made of smaller
letters). Typically, this task gives rise to the ‘‘global precedence’’
effect, which means that global features can be processed faster
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compared to atheists might show a less pronounced, if any, global
precedence effect [6,7].
Results
The square root of error percentages and median reaction times
were analyzed by means of analysis of variance (ANOVA) using
Target Level (global vs. local) as within- and Group (Calvinists vs.
Atheists) as between-participants factor. The reaction time analysis
showed a main effect of Target Level, F(1,38)=215.32, p=.0003,
MSE=544.632, g
2p=0.85, which was modified by Group,
F(1,38)=8.34, p=.006, MSE=544.632, g
2p=0.18. The main
effect indicated global precedence [5]: Global targets were
responded to faster than local targets. However, as expected, the
size of this effect varied with Group: Calvinists showed a smaller,
but still significant, F(1,19)=147.69, p=.0002, MSE=256.092,
g
2p=0.88, global precedence effect than Atheists (see Table 1).
Error percentages did not reveal any reliable effect, F’s(1, 30),1.
We further tested whether Age and IQ contributed to the effect
on the global precedence. An ANOVA with group as independent
variable and age and IQ as covariates indicated no such
contribution: the effects of the covariates were far form significant,
for both F,1, and the Group effect remained clearly reliable,
F(1,36)=7.73, p=.009, MSE=541.697, g
2p=0.18.
Discussion
This outcome suggests that religious belief biases the way people
attend to and process visual events: Calvinists showed a less
pronounced global precedence effect than atheists, indicating that
practicing this religion might lead one to attend to more local
aspects. True, given the correlational nature of our observation we
cannot exclude the possibility that Calvinism is more attractive for
people with a more local attentional bias. However, people
commonly join religious groups before such biases become obvious
(often by birth, following family traditions), which seems to
undermine this possibility. As our groups were matched for sex,
IQ, age, educational style and socio-economic situation we can rule
out an account of our results in these terms. Particularly important
was the matching of the age range and educational style.
Developmental studies indicated that the global precedence effect
is unrelated to general intelligence but changes with age [11].
According to our approach, social experience and procedures
(in our case religion), and the selective reward they provide, can
induce the emphasis on and higher weighting [12] of socially
relevant perceptual features and characteristics of processed
events. We speculate that exercising a religion and being exposed
to particular religious practices may lead, among other things, to a
chronic bias towards particular attentional control parameters.
The sphere sovereignty principle underlying Dutch neo-Calvinism
has led to a rigorous ‘‘pillarization’’ (segregation) of Dutch society
and established the idea that, in a nutshell, everyone should ‘‘mind
his or her own business’’—which among other things inspired a
rather liberal policy regarding drug use, abortion, or euthanasia.
Calvinists may have learned since early age to focus on local rather
than global dimensions, at least as compared to people not sharing
their religious practices. In general, we suggest that peoples’
attentional processing style reflects possible biases rewarded by
their religious belief.
Another possibility is that our results reflect a more general
difference between believers and non-believers. Being a believer
(totally and/or strongly focusing on one religion), as in the case of
our Calvinists, might as such lead to a less pronounced global
precedence effect. Even though this possibility would still be
consistent with our approach, further research is necessary to get a
deeper insight into the responsible processing mechanisms. In the
Netherlands it is very difficult to find other comparable religious
group to match without losing purity of culture. Most Dutch
Catholics (the only other religious community with a sizeable
membership) live in Limburg (at the border to Germany) and
Brabant (at the border to Belgium). Given the proximity to these
other countries and the resulting mix of inhabitants (many Dutch
actually live in Germany and Belgium, and many Germans and
Belgians live in the Netherlands) it is hard to find a sizeable sample
of Catholics not being exposed to another culture on an everyday
basis. We therefore plan to investigate religious belief systems
outside the Netherlands, including Orthodox Judaism, which
emphasizes social solidarity—a condition that might lead to an
increase of the global precedence effect.
In sum, given that real-life objects and events are commonly
complex and hierarchically structured, so that their perceptual
organization and semantic interpretation often hinges on the
aspect or level an observer attends to, it seems possible that
religious beliefs may indeed lead to different and sometimes
discrepant and incompatible interpretations of the same incident.
That this can happen is a well-known empirical fact but that it can
originate in basic automatic visual operations that precede
conscious representation is surprising and in some sense
worrying—as it seems to work against the scientific ideal that
careful observation is sufficient to reach agreements about basic
facts and what we consider reality. Our findings are consistent with
the New Look on perception [1] in confirming that perceptual
processes can be affected by the cognitive states of the observer. To
some degree they challenge, however, previous claims that culture
has an important impact on perception. Even though our findings
do not rule out this possibility, they show that religion makes a
difference even if culture is controlled for. Given that previous
reports on culture-related differences did not control for religion
[2,3], it is possible that religious differences are sufficient to
account for the available evidence.
Table 1. Demographic characteristics, religious behaviour,
and performance on globally and locally defined targets.
Variables (SD) Calvinists Atheists
Sample N (M:F) 20 (4:16) 20 (5:15)
Age (years) 21.3 (2.8) 21.7 (2.9)
Raven IQ 112.8 (3.5) 115.6 (4.8)
Baptized (or similar)** 20 (0) 0 (0)
Daily prays** 5.6 (1.5) 0 (0)
Weekly church visit** 2.0 (0) 0 (0)
Global Targets
Reaction Times (ms) 361 (11.5) 359 (11.5)
Error Rates (%) 8.8 (2.0) 7.3 (2.0)
Local Targets
Reaction Times (ms) 423 (14.5) 450 (14.5)
Error Rates (%) 6.7 (1.6) 9.6 (1.6)
Global Precedence
Reaction Times (ms)** 62 91
Error Rates (%) 22.1 2.3
Standard errors are presented within parentheses.
Significant group difference; * p,0.05, ** p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003679.t001
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Participants
We tested 40 young healthy adults (all students from Leiden
University, Institute for Psychological Research), who participated
for partial fulfillment of course credit or a financial reward. They
constituted two experimental groups: Calvinists (all members of
the Calvinistic corps of Leiden University) and Atheists. All
participants were matched for race (100% Caucasian), Culture
(100% Dutch), age, sex, and IQ (measured by Raven’s Standard
Progressive Matrices)—see Table 1 for demographic data and
religious behavior. All Calvinists and Atheists were educated in
The Netherlands following the same educational style and
institution type (VWO), and reported similar social-economical
background. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants after the nature of the study was explained to them;
the protocol was approved by the institutional review board
(Leiden University, Institute for Psychological Research), which
approved the remuneration arrangements of 10 Euro.
Apparatus and stimuli
Responses were made by pressing the ‘‘Z’’ or ‘‘?’’ of the
QWERTY computer keyboard with the left and right index finger,
respectively. The target stimuli were adopted from Huizinga,
Dolan and van der Molen [11], and consisted of geometric figures.
Larger (global) rectangles/squares consisted of smaller (local)
rectangles or squares. Global stimuli (i.e., squares or rectangles;
93693 pixels or 936189 pixels respectively) were composed of
many smaller ‘‘local’’ stimuli (i.e., squares or rectangles; 21621
pixels or 8646 pixels respectively). The space between the local
elements of a stimulus was 3 pixels. A global square consisted of 16
small squares or 8 small rectangles; a global rectangle consisted of
32 small squares or 16 small rectangles.
Procedure and design
All participants were tested individually and completed the
intelligence test and the Local-Global Task.
Individual IQ was determined by means of a 30-min reasoning-
based intelligence test (Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices:
SPM [13]). Each item of this test consists of a pattern or sequence
of a diagrammatic puzzle with one piece missing. The task is to
complete the pattern or sequence by choosing the correct missing
piece from a list of options. The items are getting more difficult as
the test taker proceeds through the test. The SPM assesses the
individual’s ability to create perceptual relations and to reason by
analogy independent of language and formal schooling; it is a
standard, widely-used test to measure Spearman’s g factor and
fluid intelligence in particular.
In the Local-Global Task (cf., [11]), participants responded to
randomly presented rectangles or squares by pressing a left or right
response button, respectively. Larger (global) rectangles/squares
consisted of smaller (local) rectangles or squares. Participants
responded to the local figure in one block and to the global figure
in another (blocks 1 and 2, in randomized order; 30 practice trials
and 100 experimental trials per block). A cue indicated to which
dimension (global or local) the participants should respond. Cues
that signalled the global (local) dimension consisted of a big (small)
square, presented at one side of the target stimulus, and a big (small)
rectangle, presented at the other side of the target stimulus. The
color of cues and target was red. They remained on the screen until
a response was given. Participants had 3500 ms to respond. The
time interval between presentation of the cue and of the target
stimulus was 500 ms. The interval between the response and the
presentation of the cue was fixed at 1000 ms. The main dependent
variable was the median responselatency to local and global targets.
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